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Abstract — With reference to a distributed architecture consisting of sensor nodes connected 
by wireless links in an arbitrary network topology, we consider a segment-oriented 
implementation of the single address space paradigm of memory reference. In our approach, 
applications consist of active entities called components, which are distributed in the network 
nodes. A component accesses a given segment by presenting a handle for this segment. A 
handle is a form of pointer protected cryptographically. Handles allow an effective 
implementation of communications between components, and key replacement. The number of 
messages generated by the execution of the communication primitives is independent of the 
network size. The key replacement mechanism is well suited to reliable application rekeying 
over an unreliable network. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We shall refer to a distributed architecture consisting of sensor nodes connected by a wire-
less network [1]. In an architecture of this type, stringent restrictions exist in terms of the hard-
ware complexity, computational power and energy consumption of each node [13]. Memory is 
a scarce resource, and hardware limitations prevent utilization of an intrinsically complex de-
vice such as a memory management unit. Efficiency of the networking protocols in both terms 
of processing power and storage requirements is a significant parameter [6]. The number of 
messages transmitted across the network must be kept low, as a consequence of the high energy 
cost of wireless communications [18]. Consequently, the design of a wireless sensor network 
is largely different from that of a classical wireless or wired-line network.  
We shall model a distributed application as the result of the joint activities of components 
distributed in the network nodes. A component is an active entity that generates memory ac-
cesses; thus, a component can be a scheduled computation [2], or, in an event-driven environ-
ment, the activity produced by a function activated by a hardware interrupt [8], [17]. Each net-
work node can host a single component. A peculiar problem of wireless sensor networks is the 
distribution and management of the cryptographic keys, which are necessary for message trans-
mission among the network nodes [22], [28]. Lack of physical protection, unattended position-
ing and limited resources complicate the incorporation of effective key management solutions 
[10]. We approach this problem from an application-based point of view: all the components 
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of a distributed application share a common application key that is used for communication 
among these components according to a symmetric-key encryption scheme [26].  
We shall refer to the single address space paradigm of memory reference [4], [12], [19]. 
In this paradigm, the meaning of an address is unique in the whole system and is independent 
of the application that generates this address. In a distributed system, the main advantage of the 
single address space approach is simplicity in remote accesses. The components of a distributed 
application running on different nodes can refer a given information item using the address of 
this information item, which is unique system-wide.  
More specifically, we divide the single address space into partitions, each partition being 
supported by the physical memory resources of a single sensor node. A component directly 
accesses the whole partition of its own node, for both read and write. The accesses to the parti-
tion of a different node occur on a segment basis. A segment is a contiguous memory area that 
is entirely contained within the boundaries of a single partition. The component in a given node 
can access the contents of a segment that is part of the partition of a different node, to read or 
modify these contents, by using a handle for that segment. A handle is a form of pointer that 
references a segment and is protected cryptographically [20], [21].  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our application model 
with special reference to partitions, segments and components. Section 3 analyses the concept 
of a segment handle, and introduces a set of system primitives, the communication primitives, 
which form the application interface of the distributed memory system. The problems con-
nected with application key replacement are investigated in special depth. Section 4 discusses 
the proposed organization from a number of salient viewpoints including outdated key treat-
ment, handle forging and stealing, storage requirements, and the network traffic generated by 
execution of the communication primitives. Section 5 gives concluding remarks. 
2. THE APPLICATION MODEL 
2.1. Partitions and segments 
Let us consider a local network consisting of up to 2d nodes connected by wireless links. 
The nodes share access to a single address space of size 2t bytes. This virtual space is divided 
into 2d partitions, and the i-th partition is associated with the i-th node (Figure 1). The size of a 
partition is 2t-d bytes. An address in the virtual space consists of a d-bit node identifier and a (t 
- d)-bit offset in the partition of this node (Figure 2).  
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A segment S is identified by triple {N, B, L}, where quantity N (d bits) specifies the node, 
and consequently the partition, of that segment; quantity B (t - d bits) specifies the segment 
base, i.e. the starting address of the segment in the partition; and quantity L expresses the 
segment length (Figure 3). Segments can overlap. This means that a memory address can be 
part of more than a single segment. As will be made clear shortly, segments are the basic units 
of data transmission between the nodes. 
 
Figure 1. Configuration of the single address space featuring a partition for each node. 
 
Figure 2. Configuration of an address in the single address space. 
 
Figure 3. A segment S in the single address space. The segment is identified by the name N of the node, the 
segment base B and the segment length L. 
. 
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2.2. Components 
As anticipated in Section 1, an application consists of a set of components distributed in 
the network nodes, and a given node may host a single component. At any given time, a 
cryptographic key, the application key, is associated with each application, and is used for 
communication among the components of this application. The application key may well be 
changed, as is required, for instance, when a component leaves the application, to prevent that 
component from taking advantage of the key any longer. Let k0, k1, … be the ordered sequence 
of the keys assigned to application A. The order number of a given key in the sequence is called 
the version of that key. Each given node holds an application key and the specification of the 
version of this key; the application key will be used by the component running in that node. 
Components communicate via the exchange of messages. Let cM and cN be two components 
of application A being executed in nodes M and N, respectively. Suppose that cM holds key k’ 
of application A, and let u be the version of this key. Suppose also that cM sends a message m 
to cN (Figure 4). The message consists of a control part and a data part. The control part is in 
plaintext, the data part is encrypted by using a symmetric-key cipher and key k’. Besides the 
necessary routing information, the control part includes application name A and the version u 
of key k’. These information items will be used in the recipient node N to decrypt the data part. 
Throughout this paper we assume that the cipher is used in an authenticated encryption mode 
such as Counter with CBC MAC (CCM) mode, which has been designed to provide both 
confidentiality and authentication [9].1  
In detail, suppose that the recipient component cN holds key k” of application A, and let v 
be the version of this key. When message m is received in node N, the version u of application 
key k’ used to encrypt m is read in the control part of the message and is compared with the 
version v of k”: 
                                                 
1 Intuitively, the same encryption key can be used for both confidentiality and authentication. At the sending side, 
the header and the payload are first authenticated. The resulting Message Identification Code (MIC) is then 
appended to the payload and the bundle is finally encrypted. At the receiving side, the ciphertext is decrypted into 
a payload and a MIC. Then, the MIC is verified against the received header and payload. 
 
Figure 4. Sending a message m from node M to node N. cM and cN are components of application A. The control 
part of m includes application name A and the version u of the key used to encrypt the data part. 
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 If u = v then the key held by the recipient component cN matches the key that was used by 
the sender cM to encrypt message m. cN is in the position of using this key to decrypt the 
message. 
 if u < v then the key used by cM to encrypt message m is outdated and the message should be 
discarded. A negative reply is sent to node M. 
 if u > v then cN holds an outdated key that should be replaced; this issue will be considered 
in depth in the foregoing Section 3.3.  
If the communication path from node M to node N includes other intermediate nodes, the 
control part of message m will be generally read by these intermediate nodes. This will be 
necessary for message routing, for instance. If an intermediate node includes a component of 
application A, this component will be in the position of decrypting the data part and accessing 
the message contents. This is not a protection violation, as we hypothesize that all the 
components of the same application are mutually trustworthy. On the other hand, an 
intermediate node that does not contain a component of application A will be precluded from 
accessing the data part, as it does not possess the key that was used to encrypt the message. 
Our implementation of a distributed memory model is supposed to be layered on a routing 
service providing end-to-end connection between a sending component and a recipient 
component. A service of this type may be subject to many attacks (e.g. Sybil, blackhole, 
sinkhole, and HELLO flood [14]), which may endanger network integrity and availability, and 
possibily, confidentiality of the transported data. While countermeasures have been devised to 
implement forms of secure routing [14], the routing service is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, our design concentrates on preventing possible attacks against the memory 
management layer from compromizing the integrity and the confidentiality of the single address 
space. 
3. THE COMMUNICATION MODEL 
3.1. Handles 
Let S = {N, B, L} be a segment, A be an application, and k be the key of this application. A 
handle H referencing S has the form {N, V}, where node name N is in plaintext, and quantity V 
is a validation field obtained by encrypting quadruple {N, B, L, E} with a symmetric-key cipher 
and key k (Figure 5). Quantity E is a random number that is used as a “number used once” 
(nonce) [26]. As will be shown later, the nonce is used to prevent forms of replay attacks; it 
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allows us to distinguish a fresh request of segment access performed by using handle H from 
an illegitimate replay of a previous request performed by using the same handle.  
Figure 6 shows the transformation of handle H = {N, V} into plaintext, and the validation 
of the handle. Key k is used to decrypt validation field V and obtain quantities N*, B, L and E*. 
Quantity N* is compared with partition name N and quantity E* is compared with nonce E to 
validate H: if N* = N and E* = E, H is valid and it references segment S = {N, B, L}.  
3.2. Communication primitives 
A set of three primitives, the communication primitives, forms the application interface of 
the distributed memory system (Table I). Execution of a communication primitive in a given 
node (the current node) implies interactions with a recipient node, and the components of both 
 
Figure 5. Generation of handle H = {N, V} referencing segment S = {N, B, L} with nonce E. 
 
Figure 6. Validation of handle H = {N, V} referencing segment S = {N, B, L} with nonce E. 
Table I. Communication primitives. 
readSegment(S, addr) 
Copies the contents of segment S from its present network position into a memory area at address addr of 
the partition of the current node. 
writeSegment(addr, S) 
Replaces the contents of segment S with quantities taken from a memory area at address addr of the par-
tition of the current node. 
replaceKey() 
Reads a new application key and its version from the key segment reserved for the component running in 
the current node, and uses these quantities to update the application key in the current node. 
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nodes should be part of the same application. Let A be the application and k be the application 
key. Interactions consist of messages that are encrypted by using a symmetric-key cipher with 
key k.  
In the rest of this section, we shall analyse the actions caused by execution of each 
communication primitive in detail. To simplify the presentation, we shall never mention the 
actions illustrated in Section 2.2, which are necessary when a message is received by a given 
node to validate the key used to encrypt the message against the key stored in that node. In the 
presentation, we shall take advantage of an informal notation to indicate the messages that are 
exchanged by the nodes involved in a communication. In this notation, M  N : string is a 
message sent by node M to node N, and the string suggests a specific message implementation. 
Accessing segments 
Let S = {N, B, L} be a segment in the partition of node N. A first example of a 
communication primitive is readSegment(S, addr). This primitive copies the contents of 
segment S from node N into a memory area of length L that starts at address addr of the partition 
of the invoking node, say node M. Let A be the application of the component issuing 
readSegment(), and let k be the key of this application. The actions caused by execution of this 
primitive are as follows (Figure 7): 
 Node M sends a message to node N asking for a random number that will be used as a 
nonce (message M1). 
 Node N generates a nonce E and sends it back to node M (message M2). 
 Node M generates a nonce F, and uses key k to assemble a handle H = {N, V} referencing 
segment S = {N, B, L} with nonce E (see Figure 1). Nonce F and handle H are sent to node 
N (message M3). 
  Node N uses key k to decrypt handle H into quadruple {N*, B, L, E*} (see Figure 2). Then, 
quantity N* is compared with node name N, and quantity E* is compared with nonce E to 
validate H: if N* = N and E* = E, H is valid and references segment S = {N, B, L}. 
  If handle validation fails, node N returns a negative reply to node M that raises an exception 
of violated protection and terminates execution of readSegment() unsuccessfully; 
otherwise 
  Node N assembles a message M4 including nonce F from message M3, the specification 
{N, B, L} of segment S, and the contents of S. This message is encrypted by using 
application key k and is sent to node M. 
 Node M uses key k to decrypt message M4 into quantities F*, N*, B*, L*, and contents. 
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Quantity F* is compared with nonce F, and triple {N*, B*, L*} is compared with the 
specification {N, B, L} of segment S; if matches are found, M4 is valid. 
 If validation of M4 fails, node M raises an exception of violated protection and terminates 
execution of readSegment() unsuccessfully; otherwise 
 Node M copies contents from message M4 into a memory area of length L starting at ad-
dress addr of its own partition. 
At points 3 and 6, in the transmission of messages M3 and M4, key k is only held by the 
components of A; it follows that a component of a different application, being executed, for 
instance, in an intermediate node in the path between node M and node N, will not be able to 
decrypt the messages, as it does not possess the key. At point 6, in message M4, nonce F is 
aimed at demonstrating freshness of this message, to avoid that an adversary can replay 
contents, and segment specification {N, B, L} is compared with triple {N*, B*, L*} to allow the 
invoking node M to get certain that the returned contents correspond to the specified segment.  
Let S = {N, B, L} be a segment in the partition of node N. The writeSegment(addr, S) 
communication primitive copies the contents of a memory area of length L starting at address 
addr of the partition of the current node, say node M, into segment S. Let A be the application 
of the component issuing writeSegment(), and let k be the key of this application. Execution of 
this primitive is as follows (Figure 8): 
 Node M sends a message to node N asking for a random number that will be used as a 
nonce (message M1). 
 Node N generates a nonce E and sends it back to node M (message M2). 
 Node M generates a nonce F and a handle H = {N, V} referencing segment S = {N, B, L} 
with nonce E. Message M3 is assembled including nonce F, handle H, and the contents of 
a memory area of length L starting at address addr of the partition of M. This message is 
encrypted by using key k, and is sent to node N. 
 Node N uses key k to decrypt message M3 into handle H = {N*, B, L, E*} and contents 
Then, quantity N* is compared with node name N, and quantity E* is compared with nonce 
E to validate H: if N* = N and E* = E, H is valid and references segment S = {N, B, L}. 
M1 M N :  request 
M2 N  
 M N :  F, N, {N, B, L, E}k 
M4 N  {F, N, B, L, contents}k 
Figure 7. Messages exchanged in a successful execution of the readSegment() communication primitive. 
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 If handle validation fails, node N returns a negative reply to node M that raises an exception 
of violated protection and terminates execution of writeSegment() unsuccessfully; 
otherwise 
 Node N replaces the contents of segment S with the new contents from message M3. 
Finally, node N returns a positive reply to node M in the form of a message M4 encrypted 
by using key k and containing nonce F and the specification {N, B, L} of segment S. 
At point 3, the encryption of message M3 indissolubly links the segment contents to the 
handle, and nonce E is aimed at proving that the message is not a replay. Similiarly, at point 6, 
in message M4, nonce F and segment specification {N, B, L} prove that the reply is actually 
relevant to the current execution of the primitive and is not a replay. 
3.3. Key replacement 
In each application, a component, called the application controller, is responsible for the 
distribution of a new version of the application key to all the other components of that 
application. To this aim, the application controller associates a cryptographic key, the base key, 
and a segment, the key segment, with each given component. Key segments are all stored in the 
partition of the node where the application controller is running. Each component receives its 
own base key. It follows that while the components of a given application share the same 
application key, each component holds its own base key. Base keys are used to replace the 
application key as follows. The application controller generates a new key at random, and 
copies this new key and its version into the key segment of each component. Both these items 
are stored in ciphertext, and the encryption key is the base key of the given component. 
Afterwards, the controller sends a key replacement message to all the components. 
Consequently, each component assembles a handle referencing its own key segment, and uses 
this handle to ask the controller for the contents of this segment. On receipt of the reply from 
the controller, the component deciphers these contents by using its own base key, and uses the 
results to update the application key.2 
                                                 
2 We wish to remark that we have a base key for each component (i.e. sensor node). Thus, different components 
of the same application use different base keys for communication with the application controller. In contrast, the 
M1 M N : request 
M2 N  
 M N :  F, N, {N, B, L, E, contents}k 
M4 N  {F, N, B, L, ACK}k 
Figure 8. Messages exchanged in a successful execution of the writeSegment() communication primitive. 
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In more detail, let ac be the controller of application A, and let C be the node where ac is 
running. Let us refer to component cM of application A being executed in node M. Furthermore, 
let bkM be the base key of cM (held by both the controller and cM), and let KSM = {C, BM, LM} 
be the key segment that the controller has reserved for cM in the partition of node C, where BM 
and LM are the base and the length of KSM. Now suppose that k’ is the current key of application 
A, and the version of k’ is u. Suppose also this key should be replaced by a new key k” whose 
version is v, where v > u. To replace the key, the controller generates k” at random, and inserts 
this key and its version v into key segment KSM; both these quantities will be encrypted by using 
base key bkM. Then, the controller issues a key replacement message. On receipt of this 
message, component cM executes communication primitive replaceKey() producing the actions 
that follow (Figure 9): 
 Node M sends a message to node C asking for a random number that will be used as a 
nonce (message M1). 
 Node C generates a nonce E and sends it back to node M (message M2). 
  Node M generates a nonce F, and uses base key bkM to assemble a handle H = {C, V} 
referencing segment KSM = {C, BM, LM} with nonce E. Nonce F and handle H are sent to 
node C (message M3). 
  Node C uses base key bkM to decrypt handle H into quadruple {N*, BM, LM, E*}. Then, 
quantity N* is compared with node name C, and quantity E* is compared with nonce E to 
validate H: if N* = C and E* = E, H is valid and it references key segment KSM = {C, BM, 
LM}. 
  If handle validation fails, node C returns a negative reply to node M that raises an exception 
of violated protection and terminates execution of replaceKey() unsuccessfully; otherwise 
  Node C assembles message M4 including nonce F from message M3, the specification {C, 
BKS, LKS} of key segment KSM, the new application key k” and its version v (quantities k” 
and v are taken from KSM). This message is encrypted by using base key bkM and is sent to 
node M. 
  Node M uses base key bkM to decrypt message M4 into quantities F*, C*, B*, L*, k”, and 
v. Quantity F* is compared with nonce F, and triple {C*, B*, L*} is compared with the 
specification {C, BM, LM} of KSM. If matches are found, M4 is valid. 
 If validation of M4 fails, node M raises an exception of violated protection and terminates 
execution of replaceKey() unsuccessfully; otherwise 
                                                 
application key is shared by all the components of the same given application; this key make interactions possible 
between the components.  
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 Node M uses the new key k” and its version v to replace the current key and the 
corresponding version. 
We wish to remark that each component executes the replaceKey() primitive as a 
consequence of receipt of a key replacement message from the application controller. The 
controller sends this message after inserting a new key (generated at random) and its new 
version (generated by incrementing the previous version) into every key segment; these actions 
are not part of replaceKey().  
Base key bkM is only held by application controller ac and component cM, and is never 
transmitted across the network, so it cannot be captured. It follows that any other component 
will not be able to execute replaceKey() successfully to read the new key, as it does not possess 
the base key. This is true even for the other components of application A. In this way, we prevent 
a deviated component from taking advantage of an access to key segment KSM in a form of an 
identity stealing.  
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1. Outdated keys 
The mechanism for key replacement, introduced in Section 3.3, is able to deal with 
situations in which a component omitted to comply with one or more requests of key 
replacement. Let us consider application A, let ac be the controller of this application, and let 
C be the node where ac is running. Suppose that the key of application A has been changed 
from k’ (version u) to k” (version v > u), however component cM of application A in node M 
has not updated the key. Suppose also that a new key replacement takes place, from k” (version 
v) to k* (version w > v). In a situation of this type, cM is using the previous key k’ instead of the 
more recent k”, and key segment KSM reserved for cM in node C contains the forthcoming key, 
k*. When cM issues replaceKey(), a handle H referencing KSM will be sent to node C encrypted 
by using the base key bkM of cM. Execution of replaceKey() accesses KSM in node C to read key 
k*, and this key will be sent to node M encrypted by using bkM. Thus, cM will be in the position 
to decrypt k* and update the key.  
M1 M C :  request 
M2 C   
 M C :  F, C, {C, BM, LM, E}bkM 
M4 C  {F, C, BKS, LKS, k”, v}bkM 
Figure 9. Messages exchanged in a successful execution of the replaceKey() communication primitive. 
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As seen in Section 2.2, if a component sends a message encrypted by using an outdated 
key, the message is discarded by the recipient component, which generates a negative reply. On 
receipt of the negative reply, the sender updates its own key and sends the message again. This 
means that components are able to recover from losses of key replacement messages. This 
feature is especially important for reliable group rekeying over an unreliable network [15], [16]. 
Furthermore, consider a system featuring a form of periodic rekeying [23], [24]. In a system of 
this type, the cryptographic keys are renewed at regular intervals to safeguard secrecy and 
maintain resilience to attacks and failures. In our system, if a component ignores one or more 
periodic key replacement messages, and then obeys a subsequent key replacement message, no 
negative effect follows on the communication ability of that component. 
Suppose that component cM of application A in node M executes replaceKey() twice. The 
second execution causes a new access to key segment KSM that controller ac has reserved for 
that component; if the contents of the key segment have not been changed, the same application 
key is read again from the key segment, and replaceKey() has no other effect. In this respect, 
replaceKey() is idempotent; it can be executed multiple times without changing the result 
beyond the first execution.  
When a component cM leaves its own application A, it is necessary to change the application 
key to prevent that component from taking advantage of the old key any longer [5], [7]. The 
new key must be distributed to all the components of A except cM. We shall obtain a result of 
this type as follows. The controller ac of application A will insert the new key in the key 
segments of all the components of A except key segment KSM of cM. Then, ac will send a key 
replacement message, thereby causing the components of A to execute replaceKey() and update 
the key. It should be noted that, if component cM executes replaceKey(), this action produces 
no other effect, as key segment KSM still contains the old, discarded key. 
4.2. Handle forging and stealing 
Let us suppose that component cM of application A being executed in node M forges handle 
H = {N, V} for a segment in the partition of node N that hosts a component of a different 
application A’. cM will have to use an arbitrary value for validation field V, as it does not possess 
the application key of A’. Let us now suppose that cM performs an attempt to use H, for instance, 
to read the contents of the corresponding, unknown segment. To this aim, cM executes the 
readSegment() communication primitive. In the execution of this primitive, node N uses the 
application key of A’ to decrypt the V field of handle H into quadruple {N*, B, L, E*}. Then, N 
validates H by verifying that N* = N and E* is a fresh nonce. Of course, if we assume that the 
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cipher is in an authenticated encryption mode and that the size of the nonce is sufficiently large 
(e.g. 64 bits), the probability of casual matches is vanishingly low, and readSegment() is 
destined to terminate unsuccessfully. 
Let us now consider the case that a component of a given application steals a handle from 
the legitimate owner, which is a component of a different application. In our system, an action 
of this type can be carried out at little effort, for instance, in the transmission of a handle 
between nodes: any intermediate node in the path from the sender node to the recipient node 
may well keep a copy of the handle. Let A’ and A” be two applications, let k’ and k” be the 
corresponding cryptographic keys, and let c’ and c” be components of A’ and A”, respectively. 
Suppose that c’ sends handle H = {N, V} referencing segment S = {N, B, L} with nonce E, and 
c” steals a copy of this handle. In order to take advantage of H and read the contents of S, c” 
will issue communication primitive readSegment(). Execution of this primitive sends handle H 
to node N. However, node N is part of application A’ (it hosts a segment of this application). 
Consequently, it will return the contents of segment S encrypted by using application key k’, 
and component c” will not be able to decrypt these contents. 
Let us now assume that a component cM of application A is captured. This means that both 
the application key and the base key of cM are compromised. As soon as the intrusion is de-
tected, the controller acA of application A generates a new application key and inserts this key 
into the key segments of all components except cM. The controller issues a key replacement 
message causing all genuine components to execute the replaceKey() primitive to get the new 
key; the compromised component cM keeps the old key and consequently is logically evicted 
from the system. 
4.3. Considerations concerning performance 
Storage costs 
In sensor nodes, memory is a scarce resource. Related issues are the key distribution 
scheme and the memory requirements for key storage. If a single master key is shared by all 
nodes, the memory requirements are kept to a minimum [27]. In this approach, we have a form 
of perfect key connectivity, but a node that discloses the master key compromises the whole 
network; revocation of the master key is hard if not impossible, owing to the need to rekey all 
remaining nodes without using the compromised key. 
An alternative approach is the full pairwise scheme, whereby each node receives a 
cryptographic key for each other node [25]. This means that, in a network consisting of n nodes, 
each node stores n - 1 keys (and many of them will never be used). The resulting high memory 
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cost makes this approach only suitable for small networks featuring a predictably low number 
of nodes. 
In the wide class of the probabilistic key sharing schemes, each node receives a number of 
keys that is much smaller than the total number of nodes that form the network [3]. In the so-
called basic scheme [11], a large set of keys K is initialized with random keys and their 
identifiers. Each node is loaded with k keys, which are chosen at random from K. Two adjacent 
nodes (connected by a direct network link) are in the position of communicating if they share 
at least one key. The probability that this is indeed true is a function of both the cardinality of 
K and quantity k, e.g. if k = 75 and K contains 10,000 keys the probability is 0.5 [11]. A node 
will be disconnected from the network if it has no key in common with every adjacent node; 
for adequate levels of network density, the probability that a node be actually disconnected is 
negligible.  
In our approach, the given node stores the key of the application of the component being 
executed in that node. Further memory costs are connected with storage of the base keys and 
the key segments (see Section 3.3). The controller of a given application stores a base key and 
a key segment for each component of that application. This means that more memory space is 
required in the controller of a complex application featuring a large number of components 
distributed across the network. Even in a situation of this type, for each component that is not 
an application controller the memory cost is equal to a single base key, and is negligible. We 
may conclude that the total memory requirements are independent of the network size, and are 
much lower than those necessary to guarantee a suitable degree of connectivity in a probabilistic 
key sharing scheme.  
Network traffic 
Execution of the readSegment() communication primitive causes the transmission of four 
messages across the network (two messages for the request and delivery of the first nonce, one 
message to send the second nonce and the handle for the segment being accessed, and one 
message to transmit the segment contents). This is similar to the communication cost of the 
writeSegment() primitive. Thus, for these primitives the network cost is kept to a minimum. 
As far as key replacement is concerned, one message is necessary from the application 
controller to each controlled component to trigger the key replacement activity. Each 
component will then issue the replaceKey() primitive. The cost of this primitive in terms of 
memory traffic is four messages (two messages for the first nonce, one message to send the 
second nonce and the handle for the key segment from the controlled component to the 
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application controller, and one message for transmission of the new key from the application 
controller back to the component). Thus, the total number of messages generated by a key 
replacement activity is a function of the complexity of the given application in terms of the 
number of its components, and is independent of the network size. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
With reference to a distributed architecture consisting of sensor nodes connected by 
wireless links in an arbitrary network topology, we have considered a single address space 
paradigm of memory reference. In a segment-oriented, distributed implementation of this 
paradigm, a salient problem is the mapping of segment names into physical addresses to identify 
the network node that gives physical support to the given segment. In our solution, the address 
space is divided into partitions. Each partition is physically supported by the memory resources 
of a single sensor node. An application component accesses a given segment by presenting a 
handle for this segment, which includes the name of the corresponding node. The following is 
a brief summary of the main results we have obtained: 
 Handles are protected cryptographically. The meaning of a handle is confined within the 
boundaries of the application that created this handle, and this nullifies any action of handle 
stealing. Any attempt to forge a handle from scratch and use this handle for memory access 
is destined to fail if this handle references a segment in a node of a different application. 
 The replacement of the key of a given application is initiated by the application controller 
that sends a key replacement message to all the application components. Consequently, each 
component executes the replaceKey() communication primitive and updates its own key. 
This key replacement mechanism results to possess a number of interesting properties. If a 
key replacement message is lost, the key replacement activity is initiated by the first message 
that is received encrypted with the new key. If a key replacement message is obeyed twice, 
e.g. as a consequence of a transmission error leading to repeated message delivery, the 
second key replacement activity produces no effect. If a component ignores one or more key 
replacement messages and then obeys a subsequent message, no negative consequence 
follows on the communication ability of that component. These features are especially 
important for reliable group rekeying over an unreliable network.  
 The memory requirements of the activities of application key replacement are a function the 
number of the components that form the application whose key is replaced, and are 
independent of the network size. 
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 The number of messages generated by the execution of the communication primitives is 
independent of the network size. 
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